Flow-Representation Approach For ICMPV6-Based Ddos Attacks Detection by Elejla, Omar E. O.
FLOW-REPRESENTATION APPROACH FOR
ICMPV6-BASED DDOS ATTACKS DETECTION
OMAR E. O. ELEJLA
UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA
2018
FLOW-REPRESENTATION APPROACH FOR
ICMPV6-BASED DDOS ATTACKS DETECTION
by
OMAR E. O. ELEJLA
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosphy
April 2018
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
With the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.
First and foremost, my sincere glorifications and adorations go to almighty Allah 
for his guidance, protection and strength over me to complete my research study. I 
would like to express sincere gratitude to my supervisors Associate Professor Bahari 
Belaton and Dr. Mohammed Anbar for their insightful guidance throughout the entire 
period of my research. I will forever remain grateful for the continued help, and wise 
counseling.
Indeed, without Allah then my parents’ prayers, I could not have completed this 
research. My special thanks to my beloved parents for their continued supports, en-
couragements, and prayers. Thank you mum, dad, my brothers, and sisters, you are 
always in my mind and heart. In the same context, my deepest and special thanks go to 
my uncle Basem Alijla for her help, support and advises. Also, a special thanks for my 
best friend Mohammed Ferwana for his support and help. Your great support, efforts, 
and endurance is highly appreciated.
My sincere appreciations are extended to Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) for its 
financial s upport u nder U SM g lobal f ellowship p rogram. I  a m a lso g rateful t o the 
School of Computer Sciences, USM which has provided all the facilities and equip-
ments needed throughout my research. Last but not least; thank you to all my friends 
in Malaysia, Palestine and those who support me in any respect during my research.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
Abstrak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.1 Internet Protocol version six (IPv6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.2 Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.3 Detecting Network Intrusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Research Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Research Scope and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.6 Research Contributions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.7 Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.8 Thesis Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
iii
2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.1 Location-based Intrusion Detection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.1(a) Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.1(b) Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) . . . . . 24
2.2.2 Detection Model-based Intrusion Detection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.2(a) Signature-based Intrusion Detection System (SIDS) . . . . 26
2.2.2(b) Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System (AIDS) . . . . . 27
2.3 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.1 Signature-based IDS for ICMPv6 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.2 Anomaly-based IDS for ICMPv6 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.2(a) Logic Rule-based AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.2(b) Learning-based AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4 Datasets Issues and Representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.4.1 Dataset Representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4.1(a) Packet-based Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4.1(b) Flow-based Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.2 Existing IPv6 Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.3 Features Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.4 Dataset Enrichment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
CHAPTER 3 – THE PROPOSED FLOW REPRESENTATION
APPROACH
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 The Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
iv
3.2.1 Data Collection and Preprocessing Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2.1(a) Network Packets Capturing Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2.1(b) ICMPv6 Packets Filtering Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2.1(c) Packets Attributes Extraction Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2.2 Flow Construction and Basic Features Identification Stage. . . . . . . . . 68
3.2.2(a) Flow Construction Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2.2(b) Flow Aggregation Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2.2(c) Flow Features Extraction Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2.3 Flow-based Dataset Validation Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2.3(a) Good Datasets Requirements Fulfillment Step . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2.3(b) Detection Accuracy Checking Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2.4 Data Enrichment Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.4(a) Flows-based Enrichment Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2.4(b) IP Behaviors-based Enrichment Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2.4(c) Features Sets Combination Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.2.5 Flow-based Features Reduction Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.2.6 ICMPv6-based DDoS Attacks Detection Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
CHAPTER 4 – THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED
RESEARCH
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2 Tools and Programming Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2.1 Graphical Network Simulate 3 (GNS3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2.2 Wireshark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
v
4.2.3 The Hacker Choice IPv6 (THC-IPv6) and SI6 Toolkits . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.2.4 WEKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.2.5 MySQL Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.2.6 NetBeans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.3 Datasets Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3.1 Normal Traffic Generation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.3.2 Malicious Traffic Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.3.3 Datasets Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.3.3(a) Labeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.3.3(b) Normalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.3.3(c) Balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4 Design of the Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.4.1 Data Collection and Preprocessing Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.4.2 Flow Construction and Basic Features Identification Stage. . . . . . . . . 126
4.4.3 Flow-based Dataset Validation Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.4.4 Data Enrichment Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.4.5 Flow-based Features Reduction Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.4.6 ICMPv6-based DDoS Attacks Detection Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
CHAPTER 5 – ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.2 Experimental Setup and Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.2.1 Hardware and Software Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.2.2 Hardwares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
vi
5.2.3 Softwares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.2.4 Experimental Verifying of ICMPv6-based DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . 151
5.3 Evaluation Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.4 Ground Truth Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.4.1 Ground Truth Experiment 1: The Impact of the Basic Flow
Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.4.2 Ground Truth Experiment 2: The Impact of the Enriching Flow
Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.4.3 Ground Truth Experiment 3: The Impact of the Feature Reduction 168
5.5 Comparisons with the Existing Packet-based IDSs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
5.6 Datasets Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Summary of Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
6.2 Achievement of Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.3 Direction of Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1.1 The Scope of the Research 14
Table 2.1 Comparative Analysis of HIDS and NIDS 26
Table 2.2 Pros and Cons of SIDS and AIDS 28
Table 2.3 Summary of the Existing IDSs of ICMPv6-based DDoS At-
tacks
43
Table 2.4 A Comparison between Flow-based Representations and
Packet-based Representations
52
Table 2.5 Comparison between the Existing IPv6 Datasets 55
Table 3.1 Examples of Stage One’s Output 69
Table 3.2 Illustrative Example of an ICMPv6 Flow 74
Table 3.3 Aggregated Attributes Grouped Based on Justifications 75
Table 3.4 Examples of Flow Aggregation Step’s Output 79
Table 3.5 Basic Flow Features with Their Description and Derivation 81
Table 3.6 The Extracted Enriching Features from Flows-based Enrich-
ment Step with the Derivation Way
92
Table 3.7 The Extracted Enriching Features from IP Behaviors-based
Enrichment Step with the Derivation Way
94
Table 3.8 The Set of Final Flows Features 96
Table 4.1 The ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks’ commands by THC-IPv6
and SI6 Toolkits
107
Table 4.2 Scenarios of the Performed ICMPv6-based DDoS Attacks 115
Table 4.3 The Performed ICMPv6-based DDoS Attacks Scenarios 116
Table 4.4 Specifications of the Created Datasets 119
Table 5.1 Descriptions of the Evaluation Equations Terms 155
viii
Table 5.2 The Used Classifiers With Their WEKA Names and Defaults
Parameters
160
Table 5.3 The Classifiers Classification Accuracy of Flow-based
Datasets with the Basic Flow Features Using Cross-
Validation and Supplied Set
161
Table 5.4 The Classifiers False Positive Rates of the Flow-based
Dataset with the Basic Flow Features Using Cross-
Validation and Supplied Set
162
Table 5.5 The Classifiers Classification Accuracy of the Flow-based
Dataset with the Final Flow Features Using Cross-Validation
and Supplied Set
164
Table 5.6 The Classifiers False Positive Rates of the Flow-based
Dataset with the Final Flow Features Using Cross-Validation
and Supplied Set
166
Table 5.7 Results of Applying Two Feature Ranking Scheme to the
Dataset with the Final Flow Features Set
169
Table 5.8 The Set of Selected Features after the Features Reduction
Stage
170
Table 5.9 The Classifiers Classification Accuracy and False Positive
Rates of the Flow-based Datasets with the Selected Features
Using Cross-Validation and Supplied Set
171
Table 5.10 Comparison between the Classifiers Training Times before
and after Features Reduction in Cross-Validation and Sup-
plied Set
172
Table 5.11 Comparison between the Classifiers Detection Accuracy of
the Packet-based IDSs and the Proposed Approach Using
Cross-Validation and Supplied Set
173
Table 5.12 Comparison between the Classifiers False Positive Rates of
the Packet-based IDSs and the Proposed Approach Using
Cross-Validation and Supplied Set
176
Table 5.13 Comparison between the Classifiers Training Time (average)
of the Packet-based Datasets and Flow-based Datasets Using
Cross-Validation and Supplied Set
179
ix
Table 5.14 Comparison between the Classifiers Training and Prepro-
cessing Times of the Packet-based Datasets and Flow-based
Datasets Using Cross-Validation and Supplied Set
180
Table 5.15 Comparison between the Proposed Approach and Previous
IDSs in Term of the Included ICMPv6-based DDoS Attacks
181
Table 5.16 A Qualitative Comparison between the Proposed Flow-
based Datasets and the Existing IPv6 Datasets
184
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1.1 IPv6 Vulnerability Classes (Ard, 2004) 5
Figure 1.2 The Execution of DoS & DDoS Attacks 6
Figure 1.3 Number of Google IPv6 Users (Google, 2017) 8
Figure 1.4 The Overall Research Framework 17
Figure 2.1 The Main Areas of the Research Background and Literature
Review
22
Figure 2.2 Snort Architecture (Schütte, 2014) 31
Figure 2.3 Bro Architecture (Sommer and Paxson, 2003) 32
Figure 2.4 Suricata IDS Architecture (Rietz et al., 2014) 33
Figure 3.1 The Architecture of the Proposed Flow Representation Ap-
proach
63
Figure 3.2 Flow Chart of ICMPv6 Packets Filtering 66
Figure 3.3 Flowchart of the Training and Testing a Classifier 87
Figure 3.4 Block Diagram of the Proposed Enrichment Technique 88
Figure 3.5 Block Diagram of the Applied Part of the Enrichment Tech-
nique
90
Figure 3.6 Flowchart of Features Sets Combination Stage 95
Figure 3.7 Flowchart of Stage Features Reduction 98
Figure 3.8 Detection Models Training and Testing Processes 100
Figure 4.1 The Design of the Testbed Topology 111
Figure 4.2 The Used Virtual Topology for Generating the ICMPv6-
based DDoS Attacks
114
Figure 4.3 An Example of Dataset SMOTE Balancing Technique from
WEKA
119
xi
Figure 4.4 Design and Implementation of Stage One 122
Figure 4.5 The Collected and Filtered Traffic by Data Collection and
Preprocessing Stage
123
Figure 4.6 Design and Implementation of Stage Two 126
Figure 4.7 Snapshot From MySQL Query of Constructing the Flows
and Extracting Basic Flow Features
127
Figure 4.8 The Results of MySQL Query of Building the Flows and
Extracting Basic Flow Features
128
Figure 4.9 Design and Implementation of Flow-based Datasets Valida-
tion in Stage Three
132
Figure 4.10 Design and Implementation of Stage Four 133
Figure 4.11 A Snapshot from MySQL Query of Constructing the Flows
and Extracting Basic Flow Features Beside IPsrc_First_Seen
Feature
134
Figure 4.12 A Snapshot from JAVA Code Used for Extracting Enriching
Flow Features
135
Figure 4.13 A Snapshot of the Flow-based Datasets Traffic Represented
Using the Final Flow Features
137
Figure 4.14 Design and Implementation of Stage Five 142
Figure 4.15 The Results of Features Ranking using Information Gain Ra-
tion and Chi-squared technique Rankers
143
Figure 4.16 Design and Implementation of Stage Six 144
Figure 4.17 Flow-based Dataset Represented Using the Selected Fea-
tures
145
Figure 4.18 Splitting the Datasets in the Cross Validation and Supplied
Set Testing Approaches
146
Figure 5.1 Flooding of RA Packets against Victim Machine Using
THC-IPv6 Tool
151
Figure 5.2 The Neighbors Table of the Victim Machine 152
Figure 5.3 Resources Consumption of the Victim Machine 153
xii
Figure 5.4 Experiments Methodology of the Conducted Evaluations
Experiments
157
Figure 5.5 The Classifiers Detection Accuracies of the Flow-based
Datasets with the Basic Flow Features and Final Flow Fea-
tures
166
Figure 5.6 The Classifiers False Positive Rates of the Flow-based
Datasets with the Basic Flow Features and the Final Flow
Features
167
Figure 5.7 Comparison between the Classifiers Detection Accuracies of
the Packet-based IDSs and the Proposed Approach Using
Cross-Validation and Supplied Set
174
Figure 5.8 Comparison between the Classifiers False Positive Rates of
the Packet-based IDSs and the Proposed Approach Using
Cross-Validation and Supplied Set
177
xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIDS
BFF
BPNN
CHI
CSV
DDoS
DoS
EFF
FFF
GNS3
HIDS
Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System 
Basic Flow Features
Back-Propagation Neural Network
Chi-squared technique
Comma Separated Values
Distributed Denial of Service 
Denial of Service
Enriching Flow Features 
Final Flow Features
Graphical Network Simulate 3
Host-based Intrusion Detection System
ICMPv4 Internet Control Message Protocol version 4 
ICMPv6 Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 
IDS            Intrusion Detection system
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IGR Information Gain Ration
IPSec IP Security
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
xiv
KNN K-Nearest Neighbors
MLD Multicast Listener Discovery
NA Neighbor Advertisement
NDP Neighbor Discovery Protocol
NIDS
NS
OS
OSI
SVM
RA
RD
RS
SIDS
SMOTE 
STD
NDP Monitoring
Network-based Intrusion Detection System 
Neighbor Solicitation
Operating Systems
Open Systems Interconnection
Support Vector Machine
Router Advertisement
Redirect
Router Solicitation
Signature-based Intrusion Detection System 
Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique 
Standard Deviation
THC-IPv6 The Hacker’s Choice IPv6
USM Universiti Sains Malaysia
xv
NDPMon
PENDEKATAN PERWAKILAN ALIRAN UNTUK PENGESANAN
SERANGAN DDOS BERASASKAN ICMPV6
ABSTRAK
Selain dari peningkatan bilangan alamat protokol internet, IPv6 memperkenal be-
berapa fungsi baru seperti Protokol Penemuan Jiran (NDP) dan skim auto-konfigurasi
alamat protokol internet yang banyak bergantung kepada Protokol Mesej Kawalan In-
ternet versi 6 (ICMPv6). ICMPv6 diperturunkan tanggungjawab yang lebih daripada
Protokol Mesej Kawalan Internet versi 4 (ICMPv4) dan ia dianggap sebagai tulang
belakang serta komponen wajib dalam rangkaian IPv6. IPv6 terdedah kepada bebera-
pa serangan yang diwarisi dari IPv4, termasuk beberapa serangan baru yang muncul
bersama ciri-ciri barunya. Serangan IPv6 yang paling popular adalah Penafian Per-
khidmatan (DoS) dan versi seleraknya (DDoS) yang menggunakan mesej ICMPv6.
Serangan DoS & DDoS berasaskan ICMPv6 merupakan salah satu masalah besar In-
ternet masa kini yang memberi impak kerosakan ekonomi dalam kes-kes serius. Sis-
tem Pengesanan Anomali (AIDS) telah dicadangkan untuk menangani serangan DoS
& DDoS berasaskan ICMPv6. Malangnya, sistem-sistem AIDS ini bergantung kepada
perwakilan rangkaian trafik berasaskan paket sebagai input, yang mana perwakilan ini
gagal untuk merekod sifat-sifat asasi serangan daripada aliran rangkaian trafik yang
mengandungi unsur-unsur eksplotasi. Lebih-lebih lagi, sistem-sistem AIDS ini tidak
dapat mengesan serangan secara tepat kerana kekurangan pertimbangan mereka ter-
hadap ciri-ciri berkaitan serangan dan sifat tingkah serangan polimorfik. Di samping
itu, dataset berkualiti rendah telah digunakan untuk melatih dan menguji AIDS sedia
ada yang telah memberi impak kepada kejituan pengesanan mereka. Penyelidikan ini
mencadangkan pendekatan yang dapat mengesan secara tepat serangan DoS & DDoS
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berasaskan ICMPv6. Pendekatan yang dicadangkan menggunakan perwakilan rangka-
ian trafik berasaskan aliran untuk mengatasi kelemahan perwakilan berasaskan paket.
Perwakilan berasaskan aliran membina trafik rangkaian dengan merekodkan unsur-
unsur penting dalam aliran/tingkah laku serangan DoS & DDoS berasaskan ICMPv6.
Di samping itu, pendekatan yang dicadangkan mengenalpasti set ciri yang berkait-
an yang akan digunakan untuk mengesan serangan serta memperkayakan ciri-ciri ini
dengan ciri-ciri tingkah laku dan kontekstual untuk meningkatkan keupayaan penge-
sanan serangan. Perwakilan dan ciri baru ini digunakan untuk membina set data aliran
ICMPv6 berlabel yang kemudiannya digunakan bagi tujuan penilaian pendekatan yang
dicadangkan. Sebilangan eksperimen telah dijalankan ke atas perwakilan dan ciri yang
dicadangkan dan penilian dilakukan ke atas tujuh set pengkelas. Kaedah ujian silang
dan pengujian yang dibekalkan telah digunakan pada setiap eksperimen yang dijalank-
an. Hasil yang dicapai menunjukkan bahawa pendekatan yang dicadangkan mempu-
nyai keupayaan pengesanan yang mantap dan tinggi dari segi ketepatan pengesanan
(berkisar 97% hingga 99%) serta kadar positif palsu yang rendah (berkisar dari 0% ke-
pada 2.7%) di kalangan pengelas. Selain itu, dataset yang dihasilkan telah ditunjukkan
secara experiment mengatasi prestasi dataset sedia ada dan juga telah memenuhi ke-
perluan dataset yang baik. Akhir sekali, kami telah terbitkan dataset berkenaan dalam
talian untuk dicapai dan digunakan oleh penyelidik lain.
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FLOW-REPRESENTATION APPROACH FOR ICMPV6-BASED DDOS
ATTACKS DETECTION
ABSTRACT
In addition to the address expandability, IPv6 broughts new functionalities, such
as Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) and address auto-configuration scheme, which
depends on Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) protocol. ICMPv6
is delegated with more responsibilities than Internet Control Message Protocol version
4 (ICMPv4) in IPv4, and it is considered the backbone and the mandatory part in IPv6
native networks. IPv6 is vulnerable to a number of attacks from IPv4, besides new
attacks have appeared within its new features. The most popular IPv6 attacks are De-
nial of Service (DoS) and its distributed version (DDoS) that use ICMPv6 messages.
ICMPv6-based DoS & DDoS attacks are one of the major problems of today’s Inter-
net, impacting economic damages in some serious cases. Anomaly Intrusion Detection
Systems (AIDSs) have been proposed to address the problem of ICMPv6-based DoS
& DDoS attacks. Unfortunately, these AIDSs rely on packet-based representations of
the network traffic as their inputs, which fail to capture the nature of the attacks that
consist of streams of malicious traffic. Moreover, these AIDS are unable to accurately
detect the attacks due to their lack of considerations for the attacks related features
and the attacks polymorphic behaviors. In addition, poor quality datasets have been
used to train and test the existing AIDS which also impacting their detection accuracy.
This research proposes an approach that is able to accurately detect ICMPv6-based
DoS & DDoS attacks. The proposed approach uses a flow-based network traffic repre-
sentation to overcome the limitations of packets-based representation. The flow-based
representation constructs the traffic that capture the essential elements in the streams
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and behaviour of ICMPv6-based DoS & DDoS attacks. In addition, the proposed ap-
proach identifies a set of novel relevant features to be used for detecting the attacks
as well as enriching these features with behaviour & contextual based features to fur-
ther improve the attacks detection ability. The new representation and features are
used to create labeled datasets of ICMPv6 traffic to be used for the evaluation pur-
pose of the proposed approach. A number of experiments have been conducted on
the proposed representation and features, and evaluated on a set of seven classifiers.
Cross-validation and supplied set testing approaches have been applied on each of the
conducted experiments. The achieved results show that the proposed approach have a
robust and high detection ability in terms of the detection accuracy (ranges from 97%
to 99%) while maintaining low false positive rates (ranges from 0% to 2.7%) among
the classifiers. Moreover, the created datasets have been experimentally shown to out-
perform the existing datasets while fulfilling the good datasets’ requirements. Finally,
we have published the dataset online for other researchers to use.
xix
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) has been released to eventually replace Inter-
net Protocol version 4 (IPv4)’s functionalities mainly due to the addresses exhaustion
problem of the IPv4. IPv6 has delegated most of its core functionalities to the Inter-
net Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) which is considered as the main
protocol for any IPv6 network to probably operate (Conta et al., 2006). However,
ICMPv6 faces several implementation issues that need to be addressed including se-
curity threats. Wide-range of literature shows that ICMPv6 is vulnerable to different
types of attack were exist in IPv4 such as Denial of Services (DoS) attack, besides a
vector of new attacks (were not known in IPv4) that depend on the new features of
IPv6 such as Duplicate Address Detection (Akamai, 2015; Barker, 2013).
One of the most serious and common attacks against ICMPv6 protocol is Dis-
tributed and Denial of Services (DoS & DDoS) attack due to their severity and disas-
trous impacts on IPv6 topology and infrastructure, where it consumes the bandwidth
and resources of the victim in addition to its ease of performing (Satrya et al., 2015).
According to Arbor Networks’ 7th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report,
the first DDoS attack against ICMPv6 protocol was discovered in 2011 and the per-
centage of these attacks are rapidly increasing year by year. Although a number of
researches have been proposed to tackle this issue, it still has not been solved com-
pletely. Most of the proposed researches have low detection accuracy and do not cover
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all types of ICMPv6-based DoS & DDoS attacks. Therefore, these attacks are still a
challenging problem for IPv6 researchers and security committees. As a result, there
is a real need to propose an accurate detection mechanism for such attacks.
1.2 Background
The main focus of this research is to propose a new approach for detecting one
of the serious IPv6 attacks which are ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks. This research is
needed after the existing IDSs have been criticized in detecting these attacks which
expose the IPv6 network to the danger. This section presents a background about the
main topics of the research which are IPv6 and its security issues, ICMPv6 protocol
and ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks, and the existing IDSs for ICMPv6-based DDoS
attacks and their drawbacks.
1.2.1 Internet Protocol version six (IPv6)
In the 1990s, internet engineers realized that IPv4’s pool of addresses is going to
suffer from an exhaustion problem with the explosive increasing of internet attached
devices. IPv4 address space consists of around 4 billion public IP addresses which are
not enough to serve all devices in 2020 (expected to be 40.9 billion devices) (ABIre-
search, 2014). As a result, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) started to think
about a new alternative internet protocol, with a larger address space to replace IPv4.
In 1998, they designed the next generation IP protocol (IPng) as a successor to IPv4
and it named later as IPv6 (Caicedo et al., 2009). IPv6 address is 128 bits, able to
provide up to 3.41038 different addresses which are enough to serve every single atom
in this world.
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IPv6 is developed with a built-in security feature such as IP Security (IPSec) and
end-to-end security technologies (Kent and Atkinson, 1998), therefore, it is slightly
securer than IPv4. However, there are weaknesses and vulnerabilities that have been
discovered in its structure/development which can be misused by attackers to achieve
their goals. Moreover, attacking tools such as The Hacker Choice (THC) (Heuse,
2013) have been already published and have been successfully used to attack IPv6
networks. In addition, the security efforts provided by IPv6 over IPv4 still have several
shortcomings and security issues in its implementation (Alangar and Swaminathan,
2013). The security issues exposed IPv6 to several kinds of attacks such as Denial of
Services (DoS) attacks (Yang et al., 2007; Zeng, 2010). Convery and Miller (2004)
reported that generally there are 13 classes of attacks, and all of them are possible in
IPv6 either in the same, easier, or harder ways. In addition, there are new attacks that
depend on IPv6 new features such as IPv6 Multicast Addresses which ease performing
Reconnaissance attacks in IPv6 (Gehrke, 2012; Haberman and Thaler, 2002).
IETF developers included integrated security features as parts of IPv6 such as IPsec
(Stockebrand, 2006) which aims to prevent some common attacks. Moreover, IPsec
has been proved as an insufficient and non-trustworthy technique. Therefore, several
security mechanisms have been proposed in order to provide more security to IPv6
(Barbhuiya et al., 2011). One of these mechanisms is defined in RFC 3971, named
SEcure Neighbor Discovery Protocol (SEND) to protect ICMPv6 neighbor discovery
messages (Arkko et al., 2005; Nikander et al., 2004). However, a number of researchers
have criticized SEND mechanism as it is highly consuming resources and bandwidth
(AlSa’deh and Meinel, 2012; An et al., 2007; Gelogo et al., 2011; Supriyanto et al.,
2013; Weber, 2013). Therefore, IPv6 is still vulnerable to different threats and needs
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more security efforts to be done.
1.2.2 Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6)
Internet Control Message Protocol 4 (ICMPv4) is an optional protocol for IPv4 im-
plementation and can be blocked or dropped on the gateways unlike IPv6 implemen-
tation where ICMPv6 is a core and compulsory protocol. One of the major changes
in IPv6 compared to IPv4 is its high dependency on ICMPv6 protocol (Conta et al.,
2006). ICMPv6 messages have to be fully implemented in any IPv6 nodes to have the
essential services of it. ICMPv6 is responsible for the same functionalities of ICMPv4
besides other new functionalities that were the responsibilities of IPv4’s separate pro-
tocols such as Address Resolution Protocol and Internet Group Management Protocol.
Moreover, ICMPv6 has new core functions that were shipped with IPv6 such host
address Auto-configuration (Thomson et al., 2007) and Neighbor Discovery Protocol
(NDP) (Narten et al., 2007). Therefore, it is considered as the backbone and the most
important part of IPv6 (Weber, 2013).
ICMPv6 has two types of messages which are Informational Messages and Errors
Messages. The first type is used for sharing information between nodes to implement
tests, diagnostics and support critical functions. Errors Messages are generated as
responses to any errors occur during the delivery of an IPv6 message (Conta et al.,
2006). Although the importance of these messages for IPv6 networks, they are misused
to perform several types of attacks that have been mentioned in the literature (Hogg and
Vyncke, 2008; Raghavan and Dawson, 2011; Weber, 2013). For example, ICMPv6
Redirect message can be misused by attackers to perform Man In The Middle (MITM)
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attack as mentioned in Kim et al. (2007).
Figure 1.1: IPv6 Vulnerability Classes (Ard, 2004)
One of the most common attacks against IPv6 and ICMPv6 is Denial of Services
(DoS) attacks as shown in Figure1.1. DoS attacks aim to limit the access or stop
the services from legitimate users of the targeted machine by overwhelming it with
many packets in a short time in order to exhaust its resources. There is another more
serious form of DoS attack, named Distributed Denial of services (DDoS) attack. In
DDoS attack, the attacker sends its malicious packets simultaneously from controlled
(distributed) zombie devices. The diversity of the attack sources helps the attacker
to avoid the detection as well as increasing the number of packets that can reach the
victim. Figure1.2 illustrates the execution of both DoS and DDoS attacks. DoS &
DDoS attacks are considered popular attacks because they are difficult to be eliminated
by network administrators, in addition, it requires a small effort from attackers (e.g.
single command) to be performed. In this thesis, ICMPv6 DoS attack is considered
as a form of ICMPv6 DDoS attack that is performed from a single source. Therefor,
ICMPv6-based DoS and DDoS will be referred as ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks.
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Figure 1.2: The Execution of DoS & DDoS Attacks
The deployment of IPv6 in real networks shown that many DDoS attacks are still
possible in IPv6 by the same ways that were used in IPv4 such as flooding of ping
request packets (Yang et al., 2007). These attacks are performed by exploiting the
new characteristics of ICMPv6 protocol. For example, based on the characteristics
of ICMPv6 protocol that a node has to respond for any ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicita-
tion (NS) message received with an ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message.
Therefore, in the case of a big number of NS messages sent to a single node, it should
reply to all these messages. That will consume a portion of the victim node’s resources
or may cause a complete stopping of its services while it trying to respond to the ma-
licious messages Saad et al. (2016).
Generally, ICMP is classified as a simple protocol and lack of security awareness
thus, it is vulnerable to various types of attacks. Therefore to avoid its attacks, there
was a common reaction applied by IPv4 network administrators which is to block the
protocol by dropping all its messages. However, administrators of IPv6 networks are
not able to use such these rules (reaction) due to the ICMPv6 highly relevance for
the correct functioning of IPv6 networks. In other words, IPv6 networks are not able
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to operate without the ICMPv6 protocol to be allowed and supported in the networks
(Weber, 2013). Therefore, the only way to avoid ICMPv6 vulnerabilities is to deploy a
detection system within the network to monitor and detect the abnormal behaviors of
ICMPv6 that leads to detect the attacks against it.
1.2.3 Detecting Network Intrusions
According to Google’s statistics, the number of its users that are using IPv6 is in-
creasing daily as shown in Figure 1.3. In addition, IPv6 users are increasing around
the world such as in Belgium, the number of IPv6 reached to 48.3% (Akamai, 2017).
Moreover, several companies have enabled IPv6 for their users such as Dropbox which
is serving 15% of its daily user requests in IPv6 globally (Haowei, 2017). As well as
the number of IPv6 enabled users and networks is increased day by day, the number of
IPv6 attacks is increased too. One of the possible ways to detect IPv6 attacks is to mon-
itor the network traffic looking for any illegal traffics or behaviors which are called In-
trusions. As well as security experts improve their IDSs, attackers are improving their
attacking techniques besides new techniques to avoid being detected. Therefore, IDS
should be intelligent enough to differentiate between normal and abnormal behaviors.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) can be applied to two different representation
forms of input traffic which are packet-based and flow-based representations. Based on
the input representation, IDSs are categorized into packet-based and flow-based IDSs.
Packet-based IDS depends on the traditional analysis of the whole traffic including
packets headers and payload. Flow-based IDSs transform the packets traffic into flows
which are defined as sequences of packets carrying same characteristics. Each flow
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Figure 1.3: Number of Google IPv6 Users (Google, 2017)
represents information about similar packets thus it would be more useful and infor-
mative in case of attacks such as ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks. Moreover, flow-based
representation helps to reduce the traffic volume especially with the current high-speed
networks that are attached to an incrementing number of devices (Northcutt and No-
vak, 2002). In addition, flow-based representation has been applied to detect DDoS
attack in different previous researches and it proved it detection efficiency with high
performance (Gao et al., 2006).
Moreover, the IDSs’ used detection mechanisms classifies them into two classes
first, Signature-based IDSs (SIDS) and Anomaly-based IDS (AIDS). SIDSs depend on
a pattern for each attack that indicates about the attack appearance. Second, AIDSs
depend on the behaviors of the attacks rather than signatures. SIDS is unable to iden-
tify any unseen-before (zero-day) attacks because their signatures (pattern) are not
recorded in the SIDS database. Therefore, the best choice for detecting ICMPv6-based
DDoS attacks is to develop an AIDS that recognizes the behaviors of the attacks and
provides the ability to detect unknown attacks on the contrast of SIDS.
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Many AIDSs have been developed based on different techniques such as file sys-
tem checking, statistics profiles, rules profiles and Auto learning. AIDSs work based
on the assumption that intrusions generate abnormal activities indicate their existence,
thus they try to differentiate between the normal and abnormal behaviors. Therefore,
AIDS is considered as a classification problem that aims to train a model to learn how
to differentiate between normal and malicious traffic. Learning techniques are consid-
ered as the most efficient techniques for building these models due to their ability to
automate the process of building the detection model and to diminish human effort re-
quired to build these model (Shamshirband et al., 2013). Therefore, AIDSs extensively
use auto learning techniques in their detection which proved their ability to accurately
detect attacks on many computer networks.
The learning-based AIDS systems build a detection model by organizing (repre-
senting) the traffic behaviors based on a set of features. If these features are identified
correctly the anomalies detection will have a high accuracy as well as low false positive
rate of alerts. These features are used to represent the input traffic of the learning tech-
niques in order to organize it for the techniques. To the best of the author’s knowledge,
there are no such published features that might be used to represent ICMPv6-based
DDoS attacks’ traffic. Therefore, to propose a learning-based technique for detecting
such attacks, there is an initial need which is to investigate and study the behavior of
these attacks traffic and identify a set of features that have different behavior in the
attack traffic from the normal traffics.
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1.3 Research Problem
ICMPv6 protocol is a compulsory and major part of IPv6, it is responsible for core
functions (such as resolving IPv6 addresses) between IPv6 nodes (such as routers,
servers, PCs, etc.). Therefore, IPv6 cannot operate without the ICMPv6’s functions
(Conta et al., 2006). The ICMPv6 protocol is vulnerable to several attacks including
DoS & DDoS which are considered as serious and common attacks. ICMPv6-based
DDoS attacks negatively impact the victim network resources which might reach to
prevent its services. Moreover, these attacks are easy to perform as there are published
attacking tools to perform them using a single command. Therefore, in order to sup-
port this lack of security in ICMPv6 implementation, an accurate IDS is needed for
detecting these attacks to avoid their damage.
The existing IPv4 IDSs are unable to detect ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks because
they are unable to filter and inspect IPv6 packets due to the structures differences.
Some fields of IPv4 packets header are no longer exist in IPv6 packet header besides
others fields are added in IPv6 packets header that do not exist in IPv4 packets. In
addition, number of SIDSs have been proposed for IPv6 which are limited to few sig-
natures of known attacks therefore, they cannot detect new IPv6 attack with unknown
signatures (see Section 2.3.1). Moreover, few AIDSs have been exclusively proposed
for IPv6 attacks using irrelevant packet-based representation (see Section 2.3.2) but
they still cannot be considered as trustworthy reliable IDSs for ICMPv6-based DDoS
attacks due to the following shortcomings.
• The existing AIDSs of ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks depend on a packet based
representation of the traffic. Packet-based representation is irrelevant to the na-
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ture of DDoS attacks as discussed in Section 2.4.1 besides it leads to unreliable
detection of the attacks as experimentally illustrated in chapter 5. Moreover, this
representation increases the processing time and complexity of the approach due
to the huge amount of traffic needs to be analyzed (Sperotto et al., 2010).
• The existing AIDSs of ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks have low detection accu-
racy because they depends on non-qualified packet-based features (represent the
traffic) that do not contribute in detecting DDoS attacks robustly (see Section
2.3.2(b)). Having a good set of features for attack helps to accurately detect it
besides it is used for comparisons of different detection approaches. ICMPv6-
based DDoS attacks do not have a defined set of features that are related to them
to be used for these aims in addition to the training and parameter tuning of any
proposed IDS.
• The existing AIDSs of ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks are trained and validated
using unreliable and poor quality datasets (few attack scenarios, unlabelled traf-
fic etc.) due to the lack of benchmark datasets (see Section 2.4.2). Therefore,
their achieved detection accuracies do not reflect the AIDSs ability in the case of
online detection scenarios as experimentally illustrated in chapter 5.
• The existing AIDSs of ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks do not consider all the pos-
sible scenarios of ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks, therefore, they suffer from high
rate of false alarm. For example, (Saad et al., 2014a)’s IDS is limited to a DDoS
attack of ICMPv6 message which is performed using Echo Ping Request mes-
sages.
Moreover, as an initial need for proposing IDS systems is to have reliable datasets
11
to be used for testing the validation of new approaches, comparison of different ap-
proaches, training, and parameter tuning. These datasets should include a normal traf-
fic beside a malicious traffic of the targeted attacks to check the ability of the IDSs to
differentiate between the two traffics. To our best of knowledge, there are no available
reliable datasets for ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks for these purposes. Moreover, the
datasets should have representative and informative features that are related to the tar-
geted attack. ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks have a lack of such features to be extracted.
As such an IDS to detect ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks is a must to secure the next
generation protocol IPv6. Therefore, this research aims to propose a flow-based IDS
to represent the traffic in a suitable representation as well reduce the amount of input
traffic. In addition, it creates flow-based datasets to be used as references by other
researchers for evaluating any proposed IDSs. Furthermore, a set of representative
features for ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks are extracted for accurately detecting them
and to be the base for any proposed approach for such attacks.
1.4 Research Objectives
The main goal of this research is to propose a flow representation approach to
accurately detect ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks. In support of this main goal, this
research seeks to achieve the following objectives:
• Research Objective 1 (RO1): To define a suitable formulation of ICMPv6 traf-
fic to represent the traffic in a way that makes the attacks detectable and no-
ticeable for any applied security approach. This objective aims to replace the
existing irrelevant packet-based representation.
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• Research Objective 2 (RO2): To study the flows characteristics of ICMPv6-
based DDoS attacks and their behaviors in real scenarios in order to identify
a set of the most relevant features that can be used to differentiate between the
attack flows and the normal ICMPv6 flows. These features should be qualified to
overcome the issue of the used features in the existing packet-based approaches.
• Research Objective 3 (RO3): To create realistic flow-based datasets that in-
cludes ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks and normal ICMPv6 traffic in order to be
used for validating our approach’s detection performance and to be a reference
(validated) for other researchers for the same usage in addition to the compari-
son purposes. These objective is needed due to the unavailability of benchmark
datasets.
• Research Objective 4 (RO4): To propose a new enrichment technique able
to extract new informative features from a network to be added in order for
increasing the quality of input datasets and other purposes such as false alert
reduction (see Section 3.2.4).
• Research Objective 5 (RO5): To come up with a features reduction scheme
to choose the best subset of flow-based features. This scheme is applied to the
two sets of flow-based features that are proposed in objectives two and four (see
Section 3.2.5).
1.5 Research Scope and Limitations
This research is limited to detect types of IPv6 attacks which are DoS & DDoS
attacks that are using ICMPv6 messages as the medium for their traffic. ICMPv6 is a
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network layer protocol in the OSI model, therefore, any attack that is targeting other
layers are out of this research scope. The proposed approach does not contain any
database for attack signatures thus it is categorized under the anomaly-based IDSs. The
generated datasets are flow-based datasets contain malicious traffic that is generated
from two different attacking tools which are THC-toolkit and SI6 tools. The evaluation
metrics that are used in this research are the detection accuracy and the false positive
rates of detecting the targeted attacks. Table 1.1 summarizes the scope of this research.
Table 1.1: The Scope of the Research
Item Scope
Environment Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)
Protocol Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6)
Attacks ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks
Targeted Layer Network Layer
System Type Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection (AIDS)
Datasets Realistic flow-based datasets
Attacking Tools THC-toolkit and SI6
Evaluation Detection Accuracy and False Positive Rates
1.6 Research Contributions
The main contribution of this research is an approach for accurately detecting
ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks based on flow representation of the traffic. The approach
depends on a set of flow-based features that have been identified by studying the attacks
behaviors in networks. The performance of the approach was improved by integrating
an extra set of informative features that has been extracted from an enrichment tech-
nique which was also proposed in this research. The research’s contributions are as
follows:
1. A new flow-based representation of ICMPv6 traffic that formulates the ICMPv6
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traffic in a relevant way to the attacks’ nature which leads to discriminate the
attacks from normal flows.
2. A set of basic flow-based features that is able to differentiate between the behav-
iors of attack flows and the normal flows. These features are considered as novel
features as they are the first figured out features for such attacks.
3. Reference realistic datasets based on the flow-based representation and features
for approach validation purposes of the detection performance of ICMPv6-based
DDoS attacks. These datasets are generated to be used to achieve the main goal
of this research as well as to be publicly available for IPv6 researchers to test
their proposed approaches. The proposed datasets have been published on a
website (Elejla et al., 2017).
4. An enrichment technique that is able to extract more relevant features from the
network to improve the detection ability. The technique is used to enrich the
datasets before applying the attacks detection system. Moreover, the extracted
features are used to reduce the false alarm produced from the detection system.
It successfully helps to improve the detection accuracy of such attacks after com-
bining them with the previous basic features.
5. features reduction scheme using feature ranking algorithms to choose the best
subset of flow-based features from the two features sets that are extracted in
Contributions two and four. This subset of features has the ability to keep the
detection performance as well as reduce the time needed to build the detection
models compared to contribution four.
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1.7 Research Methodology
This research has been conducted based on different stages of theoretical and exper-
imental analysis to study proposing a new security approach of IPv6. In the first stage,
detecting DDoS attacks of the ICMPv6 protocol is decided to be our main goal for this
research due to its importance to IPv6. To achieve this objective, Several methodolog-
ical steps are employed which are as follows: reviewing literature of this research, (2)
study the existing representations of traffic and attacking tools, (3) generate datasets
to be used by our research and other similar researches, (4) identify a set of features
to be used as the base for the detection of our approach, (5) propose and apply an en-
richment method to extract more informative features in order to increase the detection
performance, (6) evaluate our approach and the enrichment method by applying differ-
ent classification techniques then calculate and compare detection accuracies and false
positive rates. Figure 1.4 depicts the overall research framework stages.
In the first stage, several studies of IPv6 standard and its attacks have been done
to understand the protocol and the most vulnerable parts of it. ICMPv6 protocol has
been chosen in this research due to the main functions that are under its responsibili-
ties besides the high usage of these attacks against IPv6. After ICMPv6-based DDoS
attacks were chosen as the targeted attacks, the existing researches for these attacks
have been studied to explore their drawbacks and define the research gap. The outputs
of this stage were to identify the problem statement and the main goal of the research.
In the second stage, this stage can be named as preparation for the third stage of
datasets generation. This stage focuses on investigating the current traffic representa-
tion types to choose one to be used for building the datasets (see RO1). Also, this stage
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studied the requirements that should be included in the created datasets to be valid for
testing our research. Tools that are used to penetrate the targeted attacks are studied
also; these tools are used to generate malicious traffic in the datases (see RO3).
In the third stage, realistic datasets have been created by collecting row pack-
ets normal traffic in addition to the traffic of ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks. More-
over, these traffics are preprocessed and transformed to the flow-based datasets. These
dataset are labeled based on our knowledge of the traffic characteristics such as the
times and IP addresses that are used to performed the attacks. Moreover, this stage
includes validating these datasets (to achieve RO3) to be considered as reference and
good datasets for our research and others.
In the fourth stage, it focuses on identifying a set of features to be used for the
detection of ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks. These features are mainly identified by
either investigating similar literature trying to adopt their features in our research or
by studying the differences between normal and ICMPv6-based DDoS attack flow
behaviors by conducting attacking experiments. The output from this stage is a set
of flow basic features that achieve RO2 which are used to represent the flow-based
datasets.
In the fifth stage, data enrichment technique is proposed to be another source of
extra informative features that can be added for several useful purposes. To achieve
this research’s RO4, the enrichment technique is used to extract more relevant features
in order to increase the approach’s detection performance of ICMPv6-based DDoS
Attacks. These features are extracted either from the network about its characteristics
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and resources, addresses, or the flows traffic itself.
In the sixth stage, feature ranking techniques is the RO5, are applied to choose a
final set of features from the two sets that have been extracted in the previous steps.
Classification techniques are applied to the datasets with the selected set of features.
The output of this step is a detection model to accurately detect the ICMPv6-based
DDoS attacks. In order to comparatively evaluate the research, its detection accuracy,
and the false positive rates are compared with other similar researches in detecting
the attacks. Finally, the research findings and results are evaluated to ensure that the
research objectives are completely achieved.
1.8 Thesis Structure
The remaining parts of this thesis are structured as follows:
Chapter 2 (Literature Review): This chapter presents a comprehensive survey of
the existing detection systems of ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks. The available datasets
representations are also presented besides a survey of the existing IPv6 datasets that
are used for security purposes.
Chapter 3 (The Proposed Flow Representation Approach): This chapter gives de-
tailed description of the proposed flow representation approach. In addition, it de-
scribes the integrated stages of the approach besides the used algorithm for detecting
the ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks
Chapter 4 (The Implementation of The Proposed Research ): This chapter presents
the utilized tools and software which are used to design the proposed approach. More-
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over, it compromise the designing principles of the datasets besides their preparations
steps. Lastly, it illustrates the design and implementation of the proposed approach’s
stages
Chapter 5 (Analysis of Results and Discussions): This chapter describes the setup
and design of the experiments which aim to evaluate the proposed approach’s stages.
The results of the conducted experiments are also presented in this chapter. In addi-
tion, comparisons between the proposed approach and the existing IDSs are presented.
Lastly, a comparison between the proposed datasets and the available IPv6 datasets is
given in this chapter.
Chapter 6 (Conclusions): This chapter presents the concluding remarks and sum-
mary of the research key findings. Moreover, it discuses the futureworks the can be
further studied to improve the proposed approach.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter surveys the literature and the related studies of ICMPv6-based DDoS
attacks detection. In addition, it analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the ex-
isting works and highlights the drawbacks and limitations for each of them. These
drawbacks and limitations motivated the development of the proposed flow represen-
tation approach. This chapter also studies the generation and validation requirements
of the proposed datasets for testing and evaluating the proposed approach. Traffic rep-
resentation techniques have been discussed and criticized in this chapter as well. In
addition, The chapter shows and criticizes the drawbacks of the existing IPv6 datasets
and studies their ability to meet this research requirements. Figure 2.1 explains the
main areas of the research background and literature review.
2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems
Definition and purpose: Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring and an-
alyzing network’s traffic looking for any indicator of intrusion existence. Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) is the responsible application for automating these tasks for a
network or node that it is installed on (Scarfone and Mell, 2007).
The first published study of intrusion detection was in the 1980s and the researchers
continue proposing new IDSs till these days to cope with the newly discovered tech-
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niques of attack. Many different classifications of the IDSs schemes have been pre-
sented. The most common classification of IDSs is based on the installation location
of the system.
2.2.1 Location-based Intrusion Detection Systems
On the light of IDS’s location, the IDSs are distinguishable into two classes; Host-
based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) and Network-based Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (NIDS). In addition, Amer and Hamilton (Amer and Hamilton, 2010) added one
more class which is a combination of both HIDS and NIDS classes. These two classes
and the differences between them are discussed in the following subsections.
2.2.1(a) Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS)
The decision of the intrusion detection is affected by the place that the system is in-
stalled on. HIDS is installed in a host device to detect intrusions based on analyzing the
audit data such as host log files, user activities, kernel system files, running processes,
and etc., looking for any indication of abnormal activities. According to Lunt et al.
(1989), HIDS has the advantage of giving the information in the form of "who access
what" that gives the possibility of tracking the attackers back when needed. Moreover,
the amount of information that needs to be analyzed is less and limited compared to
NIDS because the operating systems and application generate less data compared to
busy links in a network (Vigna and Kruegel, 2005). Also in term of attacks response,
HIDS is much better due to its direct control access to the running processes so it has
the ability for easily identified the attack processes and terminate them.
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On the other side, HIDSs have a set of limitations that are preventing them from
being the best choice of IDSs. The main limitation is that they can be disabled or
falsified if the host that it is running on, is compromised (Vigna and Kruegel, 2005).
This happened because of all or nothing approach that is used in most of the Operating
Systems (OS). This approach allows the processes to change any kernel aspect of the
OS system or the stored codes of the programmable hardware once it gains adminis-
trative privileges. Moreover, HIDS may considerably affect the OS’s performance and
availability by consuming the host machine resources. Last disadvantage of HIDS is
that it has to be compatible with the heterogeneous platforms that it might be installed
on.
2.2.1(b) Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)
NIDS is another type of IDSs that has an overall view of monitoring the incoming
and outgoing traffic from a network to detect any indicator of attack or suspicious
activity. In NIDS, a monitor node is set to “Promiscuous” mode to monitor the traffic
of a number of hosts without affecting their connectivity or performances (Valeur et al.,
2004). Therefore, it can detect the attacks that targeting more than one host even if the
indicators that are collected in a single host are insufficient for recognizing the attacks.
Moreover, NIDS is considered as a low-cost IDS compared to HIDS which needs to
be installed in every node of the network which might be heterogeneous with various
OSs with different specifications. Therefore, the deployment and maintenance of a
single NIDS are less costly than for many heterogeneous HIDSs to protect one network
(Vigna and Kruegel, 2005).
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